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Sentinel Cities are the first metropoles in the United States to exhibit signs of climate change-related stress. 
Each Sentinel has a unique set of problems to overcome. In
Houston these are climate-augmented storms and sea level rise, which subject its residents to compound 
flood vulnerability from drastic rainfall and storm surge. Today, Houston is subject to several underlying 
systemic weaknesses inherited from the city’s unchecked growth, which make the urban populace particu-
larly vulnerable to flood events. The most acclaimed proposal to mitigate flood risk Houston is the “Ike Dike” 
Coastal Spine, a system of flood barriers and gates modeled after the 20th century Delta Works of Holland as 
precedent. Further interrogation of the Dutch model as precedent reveals deep differences between the Texas 
flood problem and that of the Netherlands, while also revealing aspects of the Delta Plan that Houston could 
emulate. A multivalent resiliency strategy for Houston can imitate these methods while also ensuring success 
in the distinct Texas social and political climate. This report explores a scheme called the String of Pearls, a 
strategy to incentivize sustainable growth in Houston while building emergency preparedness into the very 
fabric of the city.
The fabric of Houston, Texas
By author, 2018
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 1.o Methodology 
This report was compiled through research, observation and design, each narrowing in scope to focus 
on Houston, Texas.  First, research focused on climate change at the global scale, and how it manifests specif-
ically for human life. The next step focused on the United States, and established the Sentinels of New York 
City, Norfolk, Miami, New Orleans, El Paso, Phoenix, San Diego, Los Vegas, San Francisco and Salt Lake City. 
Each Sentinel faces its own manifestations of climate stress, and the Sentinel City framework can be revisited 
in the future to address comprehensive American resiliency. 
For this report, specificity was deemed necessary to make climate change appear actionable. Only 
half the country thinks climate change is harming Americans right now.1 Climate change is perceived as a 
faraway fate, but the science-fiction-future gets closer every year. Policymakers and the public to which they 
are beholden must understand climate change as it manifests in their lives. There is an observed disconnect 
between the output of academics and the action it calls for. This can be credited to the visualization and lan-
guage barrier between trained academics and the general populace.  Part of this research focused on methods 
of data visualization to affect change.2 This section concluded that accessibility, clarity, frequency, and inter-
activity of data visualization positively influence individual action to mitigate climate change.
 From this point, research narrowed to focus on Houston, Texas and the underlying causes of its 
vulnerability. This included historical research of Houston’s formation and the nearby Galveston Island.  The 
site-specific research looked forward as well as backward, and analyzed the proposed mitigation strategy 
called the Ike Dike. The Ike Dike was proposed in collaboration with faculty at the Delft Technology Univer-
sity in the Netherlands, and used the Deltawerken infrastructure as precedent. 
A Plan II thesis grant was used to travel to the Netherlands to visit faculty at TU Delft and explore 
the Deltawerken in person.3 Sources interviewed while in country include Nikki Brand, an editor of the 2015 
publication Delft Delta Design, Houston Galveston Bay Region, Texas, USA4 and the 2017 Hurricane Harvey Report 
produced by TU Delft, and Robbert Misdorp, editor and of the 2011 Climate of Coastal Cooperation and former 
1  Nearly half of Americans (48%) think people in the United States are being harmed by global warming “right now.” The 
proportion who believe people are being harmed “right now” has increased by 16 percentage points since March 2015 and by nine 
points since our previous survey in March 2018.
Anthony Leiserowitz, Climate Change in the American Mind, Yale University, George Mason University, 2018, 3. 
2  See Appendix A, for sources
3  See Appendix B, for travel route and grant proposal
4  See Appendix A, for more on this publication
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Chief Engineer of the Rijkwaterstaat.5  The input of these sources was augmented by direct observation of the 
Deltawerken and the educational buildings accompany them, including the Het Keringhuis, a visitor center 
near the Maeslantkering, and the Watersnoodmusuem, a museum dedicated to the 1953 Great North Sea 
Flood near Ouwerkerk. The travel also allowed observation of the preserved history of Dutch water manage-
ment at Kinderdijk, near Rotterdam. During this funded travel, observations were made through photogra-
phy, notes and sketches.6 
The travel to the Netherlands was complimented by independent travel to Houston, where the legacy 
of Hurricane Harvey was observed through photography, notes and sketches.7 Sources interviewed while in 
Houston include Brent Nyquist, an architect at a local residential firm, and anecdotal accounts from Houston 
residents. 
The research and observations informed the design phase. The design phase began as a regional spa-
tial strategy and narrowed in scope to focus on pieces of the whole scheme, called the String of Pearls. The 
design was interrogated as both a physical and social scheme, and critiqued by a panel of School of Architec-
ture faculty at a mid review, a progress checkpoint midway through the semester. The design was pursued at 
increasingly fractal scales, and visualized for this report.  
The implications of this study are that design and organizational schemes can be used to further our 
progress toward a resilient Houston.  This design vignette can be used to identify strengths and weaknesses of 
the proposed mitigation schemes to date. This methodology can be used to interrogate other coastal cities in 
America and around the world. 
1.1 Introduction 
 Sentinel Cities are the first metropoles in the United States to exhibit signs of climate change related 
stress. This term was born while searching for a way to convey the power and the precipice inherent in these 
cities’ futures – they are simultaneously instances of a wonder and warning. If our Sentinels accept their 
totemism and proactively mitigate climate change stress, they could serve as standards for other American 
metropoles and cities around the world. The Sentinels are America’s chance to lead the world in resiliency 
planning, and the first city cast as in this role should be Houston, Texas. 
 Houston is a huge, coastal city with an economically and ethnically diverse population, which faces 
 
6  see Appendix B, for travel observations 
7  see Appendix B, for travel observations 
climate-augmented tropical storms with increasing frequency. These storms are predicted to become larger, 
slower and more frequent as the world warms, and recent hurricanes have already demonstrated the severity 
of Houston’s predicament in the public eye. Houston deserves the role of First Sentinel because of the enor-
mity of its challenge and the capacity of its strength. The city has taken on disaster and survived, and it has 
the resources and resilience to do so in a more organized and equitable way.
 Houston also has a reputation, of stubbornness, liberty and independence. The country knows that 
everything is bigger in Texas, and Houston illustrates this aphorism with pride. It is a Texas-sized city with a 
Texas-sized population – and Texas-sized problems. The city has a independent streak and cuts against the 
grain, and a track record of rejecting institutional mandates – for example, municipal zoning.  Essentially, if it 
can happen in Houston, it can happen anywhere. The stage is set, the cast is chosen and the world is watch-
ing. Houston is uniquely suited to serve as the first example of equitable resiliency planning in America. 
2.0 The Problem of Houston
 Let’s meet our cast. Houston, Texas is the largest city in the state in both population and metro area. 
Adjacent to Galveston Bay and perched on the Gulf of Mexico, Houston is the seat of Harris County and em-
ploys three million individuals in non-farm industries as of January 2019.8 The city of Houston was founded 
in 1836 by the Allen brothers, two land speculators, who bought a league and a half of land at the confluence 
of the Buffalo and White Oak bayous.9 The city was named in honor of President Sam Houston of the Repub-
lic of Texas, and even served briefly as the Republic’s capital. Prior to the twentieth century, Houston estab-
lished itself as a commercial and railroad hub for the cotton trade. In 1900-1901, several phenomena aligned 
to set Houston on its way to becoming the Houston – The Woodlands – Sugarland metropolitan statistical 
area it is today. The 1900 Galveston Hurricane and the Houston Ship Channel shifted commerce to the port 
of Houston. Not long after, the Texas oil boom contributed hugely to the city’s industrial growth. Since then, 
that league and a half of land has grown into the most diverse metropolitan area in the country, served as 
base for the US space race, and is truly an industry capital of the world. Though the Port of Houston still 
ranks first in the U.S. in international waterborne tonnage, the city has evolved from a shipping town to an oil 
town to a global metropolis. 
8  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Houston Area Employment – January 2019, US Dept. of Labor, 2019, 1. 
9  Allan Turner, At least the Allen brothers got it right on location, Houston Chronicle, 2011, 1. 
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2.1 Houston as Sentinel
The Earth’s rapidly changing climate is the most daunting problem facing our world today. Many 
cities in the United States are already facing the infrastructural failure brought on by climate-related stress-
ors like extended drought, augmented storms, and sea level rise. Designers and governmental bodies alike 
are looking for precedents at home and abroad to help mitigate these and other issues. These cities stand 
sentinel at our coastlines and interiors alike, and if studied properly can be used as models for other Amer-
ican metropoles, both the developed and the developing world. One such Sentinel City is Houston, Texas; 
a metropolis known for is relative lack of codified development restrictions. The Houston-Galveston area is 
the first and most dire Sentinel to merit this type of interdisciplinary study because of its unique compound 
vulnerability. 
Houston is the fourth most populous city in the United States, consistently one of the fastest grow-
ing metropolitan areas in the country, and one of the most racially and ethnically diverse American cities.10 
In 2014, population growth in Houston reached an all-time high, with 428 people moving to Houston every 
10  Daryan Jones, Houston surpasses NYC and Chicago as most diverse city in America, Crossroads Today, 2019. 
24 hours.11 For contrast, the Austin population boom between 2011 and 2017 averaged 152 new Austinites per 
day.12 The Houston area is 37.8% Caucasian, 35.9% Hispanic , 17.2% black or African American, and 7.3% Asian 
American.13 The city is home to seven universities, the largest medical complex in the world, the NASA John-
son Space Center and claims the title, Energy Capital of the World.14 “Houston” was the first word spoken 
on the moon – Houston, the Eagle has landed.15 It’s famous lack of regulation and championing of privatization 
is the embodiment of the Texan, and, largely, American, low taxes low services model, with the exception 
of its monumental highway system. From the Gulf Freeway in 1948 to the 1980s multi-decade Sam Houston 
Tollway, Houston’s ambitious rings of freeways are evidence of the city’s rampant growth. 16 It’s success as an 
urban model seems at once impossible and inevitable. Where else is the post-war exaltation of single-family 
home-ownership, car-ownership, the rise of a middle class on the tide of Fordism, better exemplified than 
in Houston? What similarly sized city survived the 2008 market crash as well as Houston?17 The space race, 
the free market, capitalism and patriotism – the associations drawn from Houston are a roadmap of the 
American modern era. There is a mythology about the city that feels communal, collective, as if its trials and 
triumphs belong to us all – American ideals distilled into urban form. Its mythology may hinder Texans from 
accepting the reality of the situation – Houston, we have a problem.
2.2 Climate as Multiplier
For cities situated on the Gulf Coast, climate change manifests most direly in the increased frequency 
and intensity of tropical storms and sea level rise. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that met 
in September of this past year condensed findings into a summary for policymakers, a helpful simplification 
of complex and interrelated research. This document from the 2018 IPCC states with high confidence that 
we are on track for a global mean temperature rise of +2 degrees Celsius by 2100 compared to the 1960s-1990s 
average.18 In 2018, global warming was recorded at +0.75degrees Celsius,19 higher than the projections ac-
11  Marcelino Benito, By the numbers: Houston’s population boom, KHOU11, 2018. 
12  John Egan, Austin area population growth for 2019 among highest in U.S., CultureMap Austin, 2019. 
13  Statistical Atlas, Race and Ethnicity in the Houston Metro Area, 2018.
14  City of Houston, official site.  
15  This is actually a contested statement, but the first word not relating to mechanical information or landing was indeed, Hous-
ton. Meghan Ashford-Grooms, Rick Perry says first word spoken from moon was Houston, politifact, 2011. 
16  BDug Begley, Growing Houston demanded a bigger road system, Houston Chronicle, 2016, 1. 
17  Loren Steffy, Lack of zoning has paid off for Houston, Houston Chronicle, 2008, 2. 
18  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Chance, Summary for Policymakers, Seoul, South Korea, Septem-
ber of 2018. 
19  National Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Assessing the Global 
Climate in 2018, 2018. 
Figure 1 - Sentinel Cities as framework
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count for. Warming of this measure predicts increase in the rate of sea level rise by a factor of 1.5 from current 
understanding of glacial melt.20 In summary, the Houston-Galveston will be subjected to more frequent and 
intense tropical storms and an increasingly changeable coastline due to our warming global climate. Between 
these two factors, the edge of Texas could look vastly different in the year 2100.
The Houston area has a long shared history with tropical storms, but also a rich history of resilient 
response. Before hurricanes were named events, the Houston-Galveston area had already been hit by ten 
tropical storms (see Figure 3). The 1900 Galveston Hurricane, called simply the Great Storm by contempo-
raries, marked the end of the Golden Age of Galveston. The storm wiped out 85% of built structures on the 
island, and with eight thousand fatalities it remains the most disastrous weather event in the Northern Hemi-
sphere.21 This event combined with the construction of the Houston Ship Channel and the discovery of oil in 
the region, both in 1901, effectively marks the shift of commerce in the region from Galveston to Houston. 
20  United Nations, Global Sea Level Rise is Accelerating – Study, UN Climate Change, Feb. 2018. 
21  Galveston and Texas History Center, 1900 Storm, 2017. 
In response to the Great Storm, Galveston Island was put under martial law and then raised the entire 
island by an average of 12 feet with dredged sand. The 1900 storm also brought about the multi-year construc-
tion of the Galveston Seawall, a 17-foot high storm surge wall consequent of the island’s newly raised eleva-
tion. The Seawall was completed in 1906 and then extended in 1916 along it southern edge, and now serves as 
a tourist attraction in the city’s new essential industry. The Galveston Seawall is the longest built ocean edge 
condition in the United States.22 While Hurricanes Allison and Ike have overwhelmed the Seawall, it still 
marks an important epoch of infrastructural improvement in the region, and demonstrates the resiliency of 
early Texans in the face of disaster. 
    
 
22  American Society of Civil Engineers, Galveston Seawall and Grade Raising Project, 2000. 
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Figure 2 - Climate projections from IPCC 2018
Figure 3 - History of tropical storms in Houston area
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2.3 Houston as Emergent 
During the 21st century, more recent events illustrate Houston’s unique vulnerability to all types of 
flood events. Seven named hurricanes and tropical storms have hit the Houston/Galveston area since 1959, 
and flash floods have become a common occurrence as well. Events like the Memorial Day Flood of 2015 and 
the Tax Day Flood of 2016 exhibit the weakness of the city’s water management infrastructure even without 
the compounding factors of a tropical storm.23 Any significant rainfall event, defined here as thirteen inches 
in twenty-four hours, over Houston easily makes the definitional shift from rainstorm to flash flood, shutting 
down entire areas of the city due to sheet flow24 over paved area. 
In 2017, Hurricane Harvey secured Houston’s unenviable reputation as the one American city most 
severely affected by floods.25 Much of this vulnerability can be attributed to the untethered sprawl of devel-
opment to which Houston credits it success.26 Unlike the top three most populous cities in the US, Houston 
has experienced its growth in suburban areas rather than the city center. This consistent demand for subur-
ban development results in continuous spread of impervious over previously unpopulated areas. Increases 
in population density are positively correlated with increase in impervious cover, but this occurs in Houston 
without the eventual infrastructural payoff of high-density urban living. Instead, the city’s free market re-
sponds enthusiastically to the demand for exurban growth, replacing Houston’s natural conditions of mini-
mally occupied coastal prairie with 10,062 square miles of on average 20% impervious cover.27 
23  Jim Blackburn, Houston a Year after Harvey, Rice University Baker Institute, SSPEED Center, 2018, 3. 
24  Flow that occurs overland in places where there are no defined channels, the flood water spreads out over a large area at a 
uniform depth. This also referred to as overland flow. Definition by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
25  Philip R. Berke, Why is Houston so vulnerable to devastating floods? BBC, 2017. 
26  Id.
27  An estimation of PIMP is given by PIMP = 6.4J^0.5 where J is the number of dwellings per hectare (Butler and Davies 
2000). For Houston, J=3.7 if 1 hectare = 2.47 acres. (see Appendix A, page X for units/acre).
2.4 Houston as Predisposed  
Houston’s rampant spread of impervious cover over its landmass is not the only factor that contrib-
utes to its vulnerability. Houston’s natural conditions are inherently vulnerable to exacerbation by human 
intervention. The city center is perched on the edge of the Trinity and Galveston bays, separated from the 
Gulf of Mexico by the Galveston barrier islands. There are twenty-two major watersheds in Harris County, 
which condense and drain into four primary vectors, which release in turn into Galveston Bay. These are the 
Buffalo, the White Oak, the San Jacinto River and Clear Creek. Even if it were unedited by human hands, the 
confluence of these bodies means that their compound release into the Bay is a critical mechanism of the 
area’s watershed network. The ebb and flow of this life-giving network is the natural heartbeat of the land, 
just as it’s daily commuting population is its synthetic one. During tropical storms, that flow is impeded by a 
phenomenon called storm surge, the temporary rise of sea level in a localized area due to low atmospheric 
pressure of a storm system.28  This can prevent the bayous from draining into the sea, and cause their water 
levels to exceed normal thresholds – and stay there. The result is temporary cessation of the area’s natural 
water release – as if the heart has stopped pumping.
  
28  Bas Jonkmon, Nikki Brand, Baukje Kothuis, 
Figure 4 - Houston’s compound flood vulnerability 
Source:  US National Weather Service, 2018 Reservoir. Source:  Houston Chronicle, 2017
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If the Houston area watersheds are akin to its circulatory system, its geological make up can be lik-
ened to a muscular framework – or lack thereof. The Houston area is predominately flat, not uncommon for 
a coastal city on the Gulf of Mexico. When combined with the bayou backlog, this means that a few inches of 
flooding can affect large swaths of flat land. It also means that the area is particularly vulnerable to the effects 
of land subsidence, the downward settling of land surface due to the movement of subsurface materials. This 
phenomenon can result from natural occurrences like limestone dissolution or earthquakes. It can also be 
caused by human interventions like fracking, mining, and the extraction of groundwater, oil or natural gas. 
You may not need to guess the scapegoat of Houston’s land subsidence. The musculature of Houston is de-
pleted by the very vessel of its success – Texas Black Gold.29 
Lastly, we examine the integumentary system; the area’s skin. Houston’s soil quality is clay-like and 
largely non-absorptive. This relates to our skeletal system as well; with clay-like soils, there is a time lag as-
sociated with corrective land subsidence measures.30 This means that any depression of clay-like soil is more 
permanent than with other soil types, and takes longer to restore to previous levels.  These two factors create 
a bathtub effect when water falls on the Houston area, even without the compounding factor of storm surge. 
Even untouched by development, the 10,062 square miles we affectionately call the Houston-Woodlands-Sug-
arland Metropolitan Service Area would still be very susceptible to flooding. Alas, humanity has clumped 
into wonders of engineering and innovation we term “cities” – and Houston’s clumping resulted in many 
alterations of its natural systems. Given the gift of hindsight, there are several major areas that highlight the 
maleffects of human intervention in Houston. These can be outlined using our analogous body systems – 
albeit in reverse order.  
2.5 Houston as Body 
Let’s begin in reverse order with the integumentary – Houston’s thin skin of rapidly spreading imper-
vious cover. Houston’s lack of zoning regulation is well advertised – “the Z-word,” locals call it.31 Yet Houston 
is actually subject to other types of regulation. Some even argue that Houston is more restricted by its free 
market alternatives than is the average municipally zoned city.32 Some posit that the spreading impervious 
29  John Harden, For years, the Houston area has been losing ground, Houston Chronicle, 2016, 1.
30  Kaveh Khorzah, Land Subsidence Along the Texas Gulf Coast Due to Oil and Gas Withdrawal, University of Texas at Austin, 
Master Thesis in Geological Sciences, 2000, pg 4. 
31  Patrick J. Kiger, The City with (Almost) No  Limits, Urban Land Institute, 2015, 3. 
32  Michael Lewyn, How Over-regulation Creates Sprawl (Even in a City Without Zoning) GWU Law School, 2005, 1171. 
cover, in the form of gated single-family sprawl and big-box retail, over increasing amounts of Houston’s 
skin is the product of the free market and should not be checked by government. In other cities, government 
does not face that tradition of opposition. Consider the urban growth boundary implemented in Portland, 
Oregon,33 which promotes efficient use of land and public services inside the boundary while protecting the 
natural conditions beyond. 
33  Oregon Metro, Portland urban growth boundary, 2018. See Appendix A for extended. 
Source:  Kinder Institute for Urban Research, 2017Source:  Exum et al, 2005
Source:  HGAL Planning and Development Council, 2013
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Municipal zoning was born in the early to mid 20th century, first passed in Los Angeles in 1908, and 
was mainly used to separate industrial from residential land usage. Zoning is an attempt to protect quality 
of life in human settlements, but the qualification of that term has evolved over time. The metrics of this 
ephemeral value evolved from simple land use adjacencies to building height restrictions to incentivization 
of social goals. In Houston, similar effects were achieved through private deed restrictions.34 This realm of 
social goals, particularly environmental protection, is where we re-enter our integumentary metaphor. 
Under traditional zoning, developers can be restricted from building in certain areas – for example, 
within the maximum flood pool of the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs. Under the reign of deed restriction 
regulation, landowners are only subject to the restrictions deeded by previous owners. This approach is her-
alded as a bottom-up alternative to the top-down perception of government imposed zoning. To stop the ev-
er-expanding rings of suburban development in Houston, owners of undeveloped plats on Houston’s current 
edge would need to bar development on the site in perpetuity, even when subdivided in sale. A quick look 
at AcreValue.com reveals that in one square mile on highway 90 outside of Katy, plat owners includes such 
actors as; R & Y Interests, LLC; Bank of America, Katy 850 LLC, Major Investments, FST Realty and the Katie 
Prairie Conservancy.35 Out of these, who is likely to forgo the profit of selling to a residential developer should 
the tide of suburban sprawl reach their doorsteps? 
34  Patrick J. Kiger, The City with (Almost) No  Limits, Urban Land Institute, 2015, 3.
35  See appendix A for visual and more on Katie Prairie Conservancy
This vignette illustrates the inherent flaw in relying on Houston’s so called “bottom-up” development 
rules – these are not decisions made by normal Texans for the betterment of their communities. Some of 
them may not even call Houston home – Katy 850 LLC is a Delaware based company.36  Municipal zoning 
can protect the interests of real citizens against those of corporations when the two are at odds – the problem 
therein lies in attaining consensus that these are, in fact, at odds. Houston’s success has historically relied on 
the idea that they are not. The triumphs of the private sector are also those of the public at large. Inverting 
this narrative draws pushback from champions of the free market. Houston is unlikely to ever accept the 
private sector as wholly villainous – and it is not. Our hope lies in casting the free market as protagonist while 
establishing that preserving undeveloped land is a net positive for public health and safety. Houston’s correc-
tive skincare regimen is, at minimum, to impede the spread of impervious cover and prevent further coastal 
prairie loss, and at maximum, to restore absorptive cover to large areas of land. Thus the integumentary sys-
tem is restored, the spread of impervious cover kept at bay. 
36  “Jurisdiction of Katy 850 LLC is DE.” - https://companiestx.com/company/32049817425/katy-850-llc
 
Source:  by author from AcreValue, 2018
Figure 5 - Houston’s population growth abstracted  
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Second, we examine the treatment of its circulatory system – the bayous. The bayou is distinct from 
the river, identified by its slow-moving and often brackish waters. They are found in swampy, low-lying lands 
in coastal regions, and ocean tide may cause water flow to stop or even reverse. For decades before and after 
World War II, flood control engineers in Houston typically treated the bayou as a drainage ditch, straight-
ening and paving its flat surfaces.37 These efforts were intended to channel floodwaters toward the Gulf of 
Mexico as quickly as possible. The channelization of the bayous was undergone according to construction 
37  Jefferey Spivak, The Bayou City: Reclaiming Houston’s Signature Waterways, Urban Land Institute, 2015. 
standards of the US Army Core of Engineers.38 The sectional difference between a natural bayou and a chan-
nelized one is very clear – speed over absorption, efficiency over enjoyment. The channelization is particular-
ly susceptible to criticism when compared to the environmental and urban success of Fredrick Law Olmsted’s 
Emerald Necklace approach to brackish river treatment in Boston – fifty years prior.
Lastly, we examine the muscular system of Houston – the body mass of an increasingly complex 
organism. As previously stated, Houston is flat and subject to land subsidence due to human intervention. 
When material is taken out of the earth by human hands, the ground surface shifts to fill that void. In loca-
tions with clay like soil conditions, this settling of sediment is more plastic than elastic, meaning changes to 
surface level are slow-moving and largely permanent. In most cases, land subsidence is a result of ground-
water depletion – but since the 1970s, Houston does not fall in that category, as its main water supply shifted 
surface water sources.39 For this, the muscular system of Houston can be grateful. In place where land sinks 
at alarming rates, like in Jakarta,40 there is a systemic failing of water resource management, meaning that 
citizens turn to illegal welling in order to meet current need. This particular problem is not a symptom of 
Houston; in fact the Houston area main water supply is surface water from the San Jacinto and Trinity water-
sheds, so the Evangeline and Chicot aquifers are actually more stable here than those in other Texas regions 
without surface water sources – San Antonio for example.41 This shift to 86% surface water, 14% from the 
Evangeline and Chicot, was made in the mid 1970s, and was a smart move on the part of the public-private 
partnership that governs water supply. In Houston, water is not the primary resource we are pulling from the 
earth – our culprit is oil. 
38  Id. 
39  Drew Molly, Drinking Water Operations, Houston Public Works. Current. 
40  Amanda Ruggeri, The Ambitious Plan to Stop the Ground from Sinking, BBC, 2017.  
41  San Antonio Water System (SAWS) has been pursuing aquifer storage and recovery projects since 1998. https://www.saws.
org/Your_Water/WaterResources/Projects/
Source:  Greater Houston Flood Mitigation Consortium, 2018
Source:  Emerald Necklace Conservancy, 2018
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The famous geyser at Spindletop struck both oil and the hearts of opportunists everywhere in Beau-
mont, 1901, just 80 miles from our host city.42 Since its discovery, oil and gas have been removed from their 
subsurface homes at increasing rates.43 The withdrawal of petroleum in the Houston has resulted in local-
ized rates of subsidence that range from -.27m/yr in Galveston to -.53m/yr near Goose Creek, as studied from 
1974-2000.44 Although groundwater depletion has ceased due to its majority replacement with surface water 
sources in the 1970s, the clay-like soil shifts slowly and has not returned to equilibrium as of 2005.45 This 
combined with the probable continuation of oil and gas production in the region ensure that land subsidence 
is a definite consideration of our muscular troubles, and is thus far ignored in relation to the petrochemical 
industry.46 
The subsidence of our land musculature is highly localized in the cited study. The metrics cited refer 
to pockets of settling sediment, usually near salt deposits, where oil and gas have been extracted, and result in 
bowls of subsidence in the integumentary. This metric also interacts with general rates of sea level rise in the 
Gulf, resulting in increasingly complex metrics as perceived sea level rise is localized along the coast. Further-
more, according to projections used by the 2018 IPCC, regional relative sea level changes are likely dominated 
by specific natural variability to glacial melt via surface water mass redistribution, but will level out by the 
end of the century. This means we will soon see highly variable coastal sea rise in localized areas, but these 
trends will become consistent as water mass reaches global equilibrium as we near 2100. The Gulf Coast, and 
many other regions at low to mid latitudes are subject to rates of maximum rise. The Texas coastline is slated 
at .6m, or 1.97ft of rise by 210047 if current rates adhere to projections. In the case of 2ft of localized sea level 
rise, the shape of Texas and our host resemble the figures below.48 The models used by the IPCC do not factor 
localized land subsidence rates into their equation.49 This variability communicates at least one certainty – 
42  Texas Almanac, History of Oil Discoveries in Texas, Texas Almanac, 2014.
43  Kaveh Khorzah, Land Subsidence Along the Texas Gulf Coast Due to Oil and Gas Withdrawal, University of Texas at Austin, 
Master Thesis in Geological Sciences, 2000, 14.
44  Id., 59. 
45  Presently in Harris and Galveston Counties, groundwater withdrawal has ceased in a majority of the study area. Petro-
leum production continues to occur and has caused measurable amounts of up to 33.33 mm y( 1 (1.31 in y(‘). Two dominant causes 
of subsidence have been found in the region, oil and gas production and clay equilibration caused from previous groundwater 
withdrawal.
46  Subsidence will continue in the Harris-Galveston region as long as subsurface fluids are withdrawn at large rates. Present-
ly, and gas production has been generally ignored as a cause of subsidence in the study area, even though oil and gas production 
has been occurring in the region for well over 70 years. Id., 83-84.
47  IPCC, 2018. Chapter 13 – Sea Level Rise. 
48  Refer to Appendix A  to see maximum rise of 6m by Texas Climate News
49  Glacial isostatic adjustment (GIA), glaciers and ice-sheet surface mass balance (SMB) are taken into account. The models 
used are not specific  enough to account for local land subsidence due to material extraction. The text refers to subsidence in terms 
of massive tectonic shift as accounted for by the GIA modeling, but land subsidence due to groundwater pumping is mentioned as 
a cause of localized diversion from regional projected rates of rise. 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Chapter 13   
we need flexibility in our waterways.  
  As qualified here, our host city is rapidly approaching multisystem failure due to the compound vul-
nerability of its natural conditions and subsequent human intervention. Houston’s integumentary system can 
no longer compensate for the natural and manmade failings of its circulatory system. Its circulatory system 
has been channelized and made rigid, unable to respond organically to the increasing scale of climate-aug-
mented storms and thus waterlogging its integumentary system. And the musculature of the region is deplet-
ing independently of Houston’s mismanagement of water – due instead to its mismanagement of oil. Thus 
factors like sea level rise and storm surge are compounded by human intervention. Any scheme that address-
es a city would no doubt value specificity, but the complexity of this bodily metaphor pales in comparison to 
the complexity of any truly holistic regional solution. 
3.0 The Proposals for Houston
Were this thesis written for the purpose of denigrating human intervention in nature, its purpose 
would now be served. However, this is not a lesson in the abandonment of coastal cities, and Houston is not 
a city easily abandoned. Her perch on the precipice of catastrophe is the exact potential the Energy Capital 
of the World is uniquely poised to capture. Her engineering prowess, her grassroots-zoning substitute, and 
her employing power are all vessels with which Houston can become her own savior. Yet current schemes to 
mitigate flood vulnerability lack the holistic knowledge needed to navigate the natural and anthropological 
causes of the city’s symptoms. Houston’s multisystem failure requires both curative and palliative care as we 
negotiate a highly changeable edge condition.  
The multitude of issues framed here, both natural and constructed, necessitate a multivalent resilien-
cy plan that is both spatially and temporally scalable. Thus far our corrective efforts have been reactionary, 
due to lack of foresight, lack of resources or lack of interest. There are many proffered schemes that aim to 
mitigate the disastrous effects of tropical storms, but few have reached notoriety. The ones that do achieve 
visibility are stalled by lack of social or monetary support. Among such stalled solutions still cast as savior is 
the “Ike Dike” coastal spine, a proposal drafted by Texas and Dutch universities. 
Pg 1149, 1194-1200. 
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3.1 Ike Dike Coastal Spine
 The proposed “Ike Dike”50 is a system of floodgates and barriers modeled after the Netherlands’ 
Deltawerken, or Delta Works, of South Holland and Zeeland. It was born after Hurricane Ike in 2008, its 
namesake, midwifed by a marriage between Houston and Dutch universities.51 TAMU Galveston and Rice 
University partnered with city organizations who then allied with Delft Technology University, an institution 
that has already offered its resources abroad from a country that makes a habit of doing so. The Netherlands 
has proffered its water-management knowledge to coastal regions around the world, including Southeast 
Asia and China.52 The Deltawerken as precedent for the Ike Dike was subject to hefty criticism following the 
2009-2011 refractory period – what we can call the period following a hurricane in which unification trumps 
criticism. After losing support post-refractory period, the proposal and its proponents faded from public eye. 
50  The scheme, conceived by Bill Merrell over a decade ago, can be seen in more detail in Appendix A 
51  Kothuis, Brand, Sebastian, Nillesen, Jonkman, Delft Delta Design, Houston Galveston Bay Region, Texas, USA, TU Delft, Delft 
University Publishers, 2015, 23. 
52  Robbert Missdorp, Climate of Coastal Cooperation, Coastal and Marine EUC, 2011, 53-122.
Following Hurricane Harvey in 2017, the resurgence of demand brought the scheme back. The Ike Dike was 
revisited and fleshed out, and it is here that the proposal attempted to shed its nickname for the less heavily 
connoted coastal spine moniker – it is currently under review by the US Army Core of Engineers (USACE) 
for estimation purposes, but criticism has risen again as we leave Harvey further in the past. The critics’ main 
grievances are as follows: too specific, too emergent and too expensive. And, after interrogating the Delta 
Works as precedent – they’re not entirely wrong. 
3.2 Holland as Precedent
There are similarities between our Houston situation and the Dutch example. A 20th century storm 
prompted both areas to implement infrastructural change after disastrous loss of life. Both peoples exhibit 
incredible resiliency in the face of disaster, and both are capable of incredible feats of engineering. However, 
the differences are much more numerous, and merit further interrogation of what, if any, characteristics of 
the Delta Works can or should be emulated in our host city. 
The Deltawerken storm surge mitigation system was constructed in response to the devastating Great 
North Sea Flood that claimed 2,000 European lives, 1,800 of which were Dutch.53 After this event, Scotland, 
England, Belgium and the Netherlands adopted storm surge mitigation efforts, as exemplified in the 1984 
Thames Barrier of London and the Deltawerken that protect Holland and Belgium. 
53  At the Watersnoodmuseum, this event is memorialized inside huge caissons that were dropped near Ouwerkerk to repair the 
dike during the emergent 1953 situation. When outer dike rings were construction, the caissons became the museum, still rooted in 
sand from that day. See Appendix B for images. 
Figure 6 - Ike Dike compared with Delta Works, Image source: Maeslantkering, 1997 
Figure 6 - Travel scope on map of Delta Works; flood image source: Van de Ven, 2011
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In the Netherlands, the refractory period following the 1953 Waternoosdamp proved more actionable 
than our recent ones in Texas. This is in part due to the country’s rich history of water management54 and in 
part due to the size and accompanying dexterity of its government, two things that do not translate to Hous-
ton-Galveston megalopolis. The Delta Plan55 was written and enacted, the first of three such plans outlining 
governmental response to flood risk. The first Delta Plan called for the immediate construction of surge bar-
riers, and commandeered the resources needed to do so. The Plan also established the Delta Commission, an 
immensely powerful extra-governmental body that, anecdotally,56 never had to question its funding or agency. 
Upon the establishment of the Delta Plan, the Delta Commission began construction immediately on 
the fourteen dams, sluices, locks, gates and dikes that comprise the Deltawerken. In 1958, total construction 
costs were estimated at 3.3 billion guilder, or 4.3 billion USD, roughly 20% of the national GDP.57 In 2012 the 
total costs were set at 13 billion USD,58 majority financed by national budget and the discovery of natural gas 
in Holland. The crowning jewel of the Delta Works is the Maeslantkering, a huge storm surge barrier that 
protects the Nieuwe Waterweg from the North Sea. The gates are the largest manmade moveable object in 
the world, and rotate on a 10m ball joint, much like an arm or shoulder joint, to close when automatic closed 
loop sensors detect storm surge of +3m. The arced barrier face of each gate is 22m tall, providing protection 
for up to 3x that metric to allow flexibility of sea level rise.59 
54  G.P. Van de Ven, Man-made lowlands, 1993, 7-117. In-depth look at the Netherlands water management history in epochs, 
from origin to 800, 800-1250, and 1250-1600. 
55  Id., 237-286, The Zuiderzee and the Delta Projects.  
56  Nikki Brand, TU Delft
57  J.C. Aerts, Adaptation cost in the Netherlands: Climate Change and Flood Risk Management, 2009. 34-36. 
58  Id., 35. 
59  Het Keringhuis, Maeslantkering Visitor Center, guided tour. Notes in Appendix B. 
The second Delta Plan, nicknamed the Room for the Rivers project, was added to established Dutch 
flood cannon in 1995 and is ongoing. The Ruimte voor de Rivier plan addressed flood protection, master 
landscaping and environmental conditions in the areas surrounding the Netherlands’ rivers.60 This endeav-
or required relocation of many communities, but the process was incentivized by autonomy; if a community 
organized and moved voluntarily, it could ask a wish of the Delta Commission and be granted a new elemen-
tary school, new bridge or restoration of damaged public space. These were called “spatial quality projects.”61 
It is important to note, however, that regardless of how voluntary relocation may have seemed, rural Dutch 
communities either could not or would not refuse their government buyouts.62 As stated, the Delta Commis-
sion did not lack for authority or funding, thus buyouts exceeded market price and the Commission faced 
no interference from parliament or cabinet. This unified strength combined with the gathering mythology 
around the Delta Works over time ensured that though carrot was a great carrot, the stick loomed large be-
hind. 
The third Delta Plan of 2008 codifies climate change into policy. The Delta Commission, as led by pol-
itician Cees Veerman, advised in a public report that the Netherlands requires a massive new building pro-
gram to strengthen the country’s water defenses against the anticipated effects of what was then called global 
warming. The proposal included worst-case scenario evacuation methods and estimated pricing of protection 
against sea level rise in the North Sea, stating they must plan for a rise of 1.3m (4.3ft) by 2100 and 4m (13.1ft) by 
2200.63 
Since their full construction in 1997, the Delta Works have proved successful at preventing loss of 
property and life, but that is not their only gift to the public. There is also a sense of identity and pride built 
into these sites of historic water infrastructure. 
The Deltawerken naturally acquire this mythological quality through an already established narra-
tive –the social architecture of Dutch water infrastructure is written into its history. Twenty-six percent of the 
country is below sea level, and some 3,000 polders64 reclaim that land from the sea. After all, God created the 
Earth but the Dutch created Holland.65  Dikes, windmills and polders framed the first land management strate-
gies in Dutch settlements, and pepper the country’s military history as well. A dike is a vector of raised land 
 
61  Id. 
62  Id. 
63  Id.
64  Van de Ven, Id., History of water management, origin to 800, 14. 
65  Dutch saying, popular in Kinderdijk, Netherlands. Original author unknown. 
Figure 6 - Travel photos compiledSource:  Deltawerken, 2001
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that protects a polder, an area of low-lying land reclaimed from the sea, while a windmill pumps water from 
the polder area outside of the protective dike boundary using wind energy.66 Dutch folk tales feature these 
human forms as narrative device.67 The dike is at once mitigating and militant, managing and mythical, and a 
social cornerstone of the Dutch collective memory. 
When visiting Kinderdijk, a UNESCO World Heritage Site famed for its beautiful, functioning, his-
toric windmills, I was surprised by the presence of construction on a preserved site. The visitor center is 
reinvesting capital in itself alongside government funds to build a new learning center and pedestrian bridge 
to match its status. Signage reads, A New Entrance Worthy of a UNESCO World Heritage Site, Coming Soon! 
One of the windmills is preserved as a museum to tell the story of a traditional miller family’s way of life.68 
The latticed blades were even used to signal familial or communal happenings – weddings, births, deaths. 
The windmill is a livable machine that spanned the programs of safety, housing and communications. In the 
Netherlands, water infrastructure at even its earliest examples avoided mono-functional intervention. Water 
infrastructure in Holland speaks histories, large and small. 
66  Kinderdijk, signage. See Appendix B for more. 
67  Example of Dutch dike mythology - Albertus Boli, The Little Dutch Boy Who Saved Holland, Young Readers. Boli’s Fables for 
Children Who Are Too Old to Believe in Fables. Published 2009.  
68  Kinderdijk, Windmill Museum. See Appendix B for notes. 
The Delta Works themselves are a modern example of that same idea. The Works were constructed 
to shorten the Dutch coastline, decreasing the mileage vulnerable to storm surge and protecting the Low 
Countries farther inland. Though the primary purpose of the Works was to protect the perimeter, all are 
multifunctional pieces of infrastructure. Nine of the fourteen interventions act as road infrastructure while 
also damming the inner waters from the volatile North Sea.69 The Haringvlietdam, completed in 1971, is a dam 
but also a flood barrier comprised of seventeen sluice gates, with a roadway atop them. Most dams also act as 
recreational zones with hike and bike trails, and educational material about wildlife in the area. The longest 
of the Works, the Oosterscheldekering, includes artificial island masses that now houses a water amusement 
park called the Deltapark Neeltje Jans. The park also educates the public about the Deltawerken and a pan-
orama film of the 1953 North Sea Flood. Its attractions are mostly targeted for children, but the summertime 
weekly tours inside the inflatable surge barriers attract many dam enthusiasts. The Deltawerken themselves 
are multifunctional interventions, from the connections they provide through roadways to recreational and 
tourism uses. 
Another factor present in the Delta Plan is the combined use of hard and soft infrastructures. The 
Oesterdam farther inland is a roadway and dam as well as an example of sand nourishment through “rain-
bow dredging,” a technique of dredging sand and augmenting landmass with the dredged material. Delta 
engineers capitalized on the underlying principle of coastal erosion, that on the leeward side of hard surface, 
land will erode and follow the tide. Using this idea, the sand nourishment is placed so that over the course of 
20 years, its position will be adjusted and spread by tide to flow naturally into its best attenuation form. This 
technique is used on the Scheveningen beaches of The Hague as well, and Missdorp has worked to spread 
this technique to at-risk edges in many Southeast Asian cities.70 Another example of Dutch soft infrastructure 
is preventative rather than retaliatory – the enforced development ban on the coastline. Eighty percent of the 
Dutch coastline is unbuilt,71 to prevent that leeward coastal erosion and preserve the elasticity of the beaches 
as the country negotiates sea level rise in the coming decades. 
The methods of the Deltawerken were not without criticism however – many environmental groups 
pushed back against the interruption of estuary ecosystems. Much of the soft infrastructure solutions cited 
resulted from environmental pushback. The separation of the fresh- and salt-water bodies resulted in inter-
ruption of tides, which in turn caused loss of floral and faunal life in the rivers. The interruption of flow also 
69  “Delta Works,” Deltawerken, Official Site. 
70  Robbert Misdrop, Climate of Coastal Cooperation, 2011. Asia and Island States, 53-122. Sand Nourishment – 164. 
71  Id., 160. 
Figure 7 - Travel route with highlighted Works 
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caused sediment and sludge build-up in the rivers because of the loss of its natural outlet. Delta maintenance 
consequently dredges and clears impeded rivers to maintain water capacity and flow. The second and third 
Delta Plans considered environmental impact in more depth than did the first, and though the increased cost 
to the Delta program was significant, these environmental measures were received favorably. 
Lastly, there are the accompanying programs that have sprung up around such monumental interven-
tions. It is not only at UNESCO World Heritage sites that the Dutch celebrate their knowledge in glass and 
stone – there are three official visitor centers for the Delta Works, at the Maeslantkering, the Deltapark Neelt-
je Jans, and the Waternoosdamp Museum dedicated to the 1953 North Sea Flood. The Keringhuis is the vis-
itor center adjacent to the Maeslantkering, and it tells the history of the Delta Works and their legacy in the 
wider world. It also offers a walking tour in three languages of the huge gate itself, and hosts the huge public 
viewing and celebration of the gates every September when the Maeslantkering is tested before the rainy 
season.72 The Deltapark is a great example of monetization of a new asset – the artificial islands – created by 
the Works, while also educating the public about their presence and longevity. The Watersnoodmuseum is a 
microcosm of a perceived larger phenomenon – the artistry and memorialization of the 1953 Flood through-
out the low countries of South Holland and Zeeland. Below is an art map of each region paired with one such 
memorial, from a Watersnoodmuseum published collection73 immortalizing the artists and their works that 
strove to memorialize the resiliency of the Dutch people and their heroism. This existing imagery of memory 
is an important ingredient of the mythology that surrounds and empowers the Delta Works. 
72  From Het Keringhuis, visitor center at Maeslantkering. See Appendix B. 
73  Watersnoodmuseum,  het water | de storm | de stitle,; De Monumenten van de Watersnood 1953, 2010 with supplement in 
2016. 
3.3 Holland as Imitable 
Now we can contrast these established methods of the Deltawerken to our host city half a world 
away. The Delta Commission was a unified, empowered authority with the resources to affect infrastructural 
megaprojects and enact buyout programs. Sea level rise and climate change are codified into Dutch policy. In 
contrast, in January of 2019 our president tweeted,74 
74  “Be careful and try staying in your house. Large parts of the Country are suffering from tremendous amounts of snow and 
near record setting cold. Amazing how big this system is. Wouldn’t be bad to have a little of that good old fashioned Global Warm-
ing right now!” @realDonaldTrump, 2019. 
Figure 9 - 1953 Flood memorial with art map of ZeelandSource: de Monumenten de Watersnoodamp, 2011
Source:  tweepsmap.com, captured 2018Source:  Twitter, captured 2018 
Figure 8: Travel photos, Watersnoodmuseum interior
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The president’s tweets alone are not indication of public opinion. Yet there are many people in the 
suburban rings of the Houstonia system that could be called the “Trump base.”75 There is major overlap 
between Houston area residents and Trump supporters, a population that we will eventually need to support 
any infrastructural program in Houston. Though lately there has been talk of the Republican Party “taking 
back climate change,”76 it is counterproductive for the chief executive of these United States to harp the hoax 
harmonica each time a super snowstorm hits the Midwest – a phenomenon which climate change actually 
predicts hand in hand with sea level rise.77 The result is a divided front in the fight against climate change. 
There are many people in Texas who follow the president on Twitter. There are not as many people in Texas 
who would know that ten days preceding said tweet, the Department of Defense released a 22-page report 
that details the 79 military installation vulnerabilities over the next 20 years due to the effects of climate 
change.78 There is an appearances problem that severely limits the language with which we can discuss Hous-
ton’s vulnerability, which in turn hinders any action taken to address it. Fear of a name increases fear of the 
thing itself79 – and Houston, we are afraid. 
We are not only crippled by the lack of transparent rhetoric concerning climate change on the Texas 
coast – the Texan model of low taxes, low services is directly at odds with the Deltawerken precedent. The 
most common criticism of the “Ike Dike” scheme is its cost to the taxpayer,80 even when supplemented by 
federal dollars. Texans are distrustful of government funded anything – even disaster relief. Following Hurri-
cane Harvey, the Volunteer Navy of truck-driving boat-owners were the heralded as heroes, while FEMA was 
indicated as culprit for its insurance flaws and inaccurate floodplains.  Houstonians value the free market and 
individual liberty – the only way to massive infrastructural change in Texas is through public-private partner-
ships that bill at minimal cost to the taxpayer, an entirely different methodology than that used to erect the 
Delta Works.
The Room for the Rivers project as precedent is also inhibited by Houston’s reluctance to accept gov-
ernment interference in land use – long established by its zoning substitutes. The voluntary Home Buyout 
75  John Harden, Houston-Area Maps Show Where Democrats, GOP are Gaining Votes, Houston Chronicle, 2018. 
76  Oliver Milman, The young republicans breaking with their party over climate change, reclamation in sight, The Guardian, 
Philadelphia, 2019.  
77  IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, 2018, Chapter 13 – Sea Level Change, 1143. 
78  Department of Defense, Report on Effects of a Changing Climate to the Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secre-
tary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. Cleared for Open Publication, Jan. 2019. 
79  J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone, 1997, 335. 
80  Seamus McGraw, Will Taxpayers Foot the Bill to Protect Oil Industry from Climate Change? Climate Liability News, 2018. 
plan has met with measured success,81 but market rate buyouts for all volunteers far exceeds its funding.82 
Furthermore, once bought-out land belongs to the government, it leaves the market, effectively taking a 
private asset and replacing it with a public deficit. Managed retreat is an established strategy for flood mitiga-
tion – after all, a house demolished is a house that will never flood again. Yet in addition to the lack of suffi-
cient funding for those that do wish to relocate, there are plenty of bayou-dwelling homeowners who would 
rather rebuild than relocate. Houstonians have built and chosen their communities, and are not in any hurry 
to leave them. Furthermore, the current flood insurance policies support rebuilding more than it does relo-
cating,83 which contributes to cyclical resident distress and displacement with each flood event. Anecdotally, 
the only residents who accepted took a buyout in the affluent micro-metropolis Hunters Creek Village along 
Buffalo Bayou are older residents who were considering relocating senior living facilities even before their 
home flooded during Harvey.84 The remainder are rebuilding, elevating their homes the required 5.5ft in the 
100-year floodplain.85 
Another inhibitor to the plan is Houston’s chosen patchwork policy of deed restrictions. For the kind 
of large-scale buyout necessary to widen and deepen the rivers like in the Dutch example, thousands of indi-
vidual deeds would require legal scrutiny, and overturning common residential restrictions like prohibitive 
land use, material palettes or adjacent structures like maintenance sheds. Prohibitive land use restrictions 
could also be used to block the kind of “spatial quality projects” the Delta Plan used to incentive autonomy 
in the buyout process. The physical differences between Texas and Holland are equally as important as the 
socio-political ones. The dike and polder recipe of Dutch water management is enabled by its peaty ground 
quality – we have already discussed the drawbacks of Houston’s clay-like integumentary system, and this is 
one more example. A second geological distinction is Galveston Island and the Bolivar Peninsula. The Delta 
Works were an effort to shorten the Dutch coastline through infrastructure – the vector along Galveston’s 
seaward edge is already an efficient line with which we can separate the inland from the Atlantic. Thinking 
of the entire Galveston edge as a piece of Delta infrastructure is a jump in scale akin to that between a basket-
ball and a marble. 
81  Harris County Flood Control District, Latest Updates About Home Buyouts, Home Buyout Program, updated May 1 2018. 
Houston Consortium, Report, pg 10. See Appendix A for more. 
82  A.R. Siders, Government-funded buyouts after disasters are slow and inequitable – here’s how that could change, The 
Conversation, Environment and Energy Section. 2018. 
83  Jim Emerson, What Private Mortgage Lenders Want You to Know About Flood Insurance in Texas Amilenders, self-pub-
lished, 2018. 
84  Anecdotal from conversation with Hunter Creek residents and members of the Hunter Creek Neighborhood Association. See 
Appendix B for extended.  
85  Anecdotal, from conversation with local architect. See Appendix B for extended. 
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The premise of the Delta Works is to protect its edge from storm surge, but the surge in Holland is 
very different from that which Houston faces. We have established Houston’s compound vulnerability to plu-
vial, fluvial and storm surge flooding. The Netherlands does not face hurricane level rainfall, especially those 
of Hurricane Harvey, the latest metric of disaster. The bayou flooding is not addressed in the Ike Dike coastal 
spine, which is primarily an edge consideration that protects from temporary sea rise. If constructed, the 
Ike Dike would allow the watersheds to drain into Galveston Bay, as the bay would remain at mostly normal 
levels.86 
86  Blackburn, Houston a Year After Harvey, Rice University and SSPEED Center, 2018, 49.  
But when subjugated to record rainfall events like Hurricane Harvey, a phenomenon predicted to 
increase in frequency, the areas adjacent to bayous still face flood vulnerability and immobility due to sheet 
flow between watersheds. Not only are there many social, political and physical differences between the 
Netherlands and Texas, the proposed Ike Dike scheme only addresses half of Houston’s compound flood 
vulnerability. The storm surge focus of the scheme is leftover from its Dutch origins and its namesake – Hur-
ricane Ike was primarily a storm surge event. Yet Houston is subject to more than just surge, and the criticism 
that the Dutch –inspired plan is too specific is founded in fact.  
The Delta Works and consequent Delta Plans have saved the Netherlands. They have also affected a 
less quantifiable metric of social architecture that ensures their longevity and flexibility. In my time visiting 
Source:  Nilleson, 2015
Source:  Dawson via Blackburn, 2018
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Holland, I came to know that level of physical and social architecture, which I believe, despite our differences, 
Houston can attain – in its own way.
 
We cannot simply copy engineering tactics used by European cities - if the answer were this simple, it 
would have been done long ago. The issues of citywide flood infrastructure are wrapped up with socio-eco-
nomic ones, like government spending, renter’s and flood insurance, and the social responsibility of planners, 
architects and municipal zoning bodies to protect citizens against the next disaster. What we can emulate is 
the multi-faceted approach the Netherlands has implemented, addressing both edge condition and internal 
drainage in a scheme that is spatially and temporally fractal. 
Like any systemic method of infrastructure in the United States, water management can be used to 
disempower minority and low-income populations. Houston, with its socially and economically diverse cit-
izenry, is uniquely positioned to serve as a model for equitable resiliency for other Sentinels throughout the 
country. Therefore any resiliency plan must look at the ways flood events affect the disproportionately vul-
nerable populations of Houston. 
3.4 Houston’s Compound Vulnerability 
The first vulnerability Houston faces is almost universal among its inhabitants – the car commuter 
workforce. During Hurricane Harvey, Houston was transformed into an archipelago of physically isolated 
zones by the deadly combination of car dependency and flooded highways. Houston-area workers commute 
on average 24 miles daily,87 and the standing water left behind by the storm and controlled levee release 
stalled the Houston workforce for ten days. Furthermore, gas prices in Texas increased by $0.50/gallon fol-
lowing the decreased capacity of Houston refineries post Harvey by 3 million barrels per day, a metric that 
represents 16% of the nation’s refining capacity.88 In addition, as estimated 366,000 personal vehicles suffered 
damages due to Harvey, flooding the market with damaged vehicles in a city where car dependence is strong. 
Lastly, 54 of the reported 78 fatalities reported by September 1, 2017, were drownings, the majority of which 
occurred while driving into floodwaters or being swept away by current after exiting a vehicle.89 Car culture 
and floodwaters are a deadly combination. 
87  David Crossley, The 3-hour commute? City Mobility Plan explained, HoustonTomorrow, 2009. 
88  TU Delft, Hurricane Harvey Report; a fact-finding effort in the direct aftermath of Hurricane Harvey in the Greater Hous-
ton Region, TU Delft, Rice University, TAMU Galveston, 2017, 50 – Indirect Damages
89  Id., 58 – Data Analysis  
The second vulnerability Houstonians face is their environmental welfare, which relates directly to 
the disparity of income in the area. Harvey flooding severely compromised industrial facilities that manufac-
ture plastics, chemicals and petrochemicals, and the contamination of these compromised industries is still 
being evaluated.90  The Arkema facility in Crosby in particular was subject to explosions and high contamina-
90  Id., 49. Direct Damages.
Figure 10: Highway flood incidents over photo by  Houston Chronicle, 2017
Figure 11: Houston as physically isolated islands during Harvey, over image by Kinder Institute of Urban Research, 2017
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tion, due to the degradation of temperature sensitive storage containers.91 As of September 12, 2017, Hurricane 
Harvey caused an estimated 2,000 tons of chemical release into the standing waters near these facilities. The 
adjacency of low socio-economic neighborhoods to industrial land uses, and the resultant contaminants they 
release under pressure, is one more example of how urban vulnerability is linked to economic status. Vulner-
ability can be read spatially through land use and income levels, and any scheme that attempts to aid Hous-
ton should react accordingly. 
The third level of vulnerability is the presence of language barriers in the city. Because of its massive 
employment force, Houston is a huge hub for immigration, and parts of the city have seen an enclave effect 
as ethnic groups gather together and form their new communities. This is not a stance on what Houston can 
or should do concerning non-English speakers in the workforce – merely an observation that these popu-
lations are also particularly vulnerable to misinformation and isolation during flood events. An estimated 
44% of households in Harris County are non-English speaking households.92 Thirty-three percent are Span-
ish-speaking households.93 There are swaths of Houston where English is not the population’s first spoken 
language, and when this social barrier is compounded by the physical barriers of flooding we are looking at a 
very different Houston than the one we are used to seeing. 
91  Id., 50 – Indirect Damages, Environmental Damage.
92  US Census Bureau, Limited English Speaking Households, 2017. 
93  Id. 
The fourth level of vulnerability is information shortage, before, during and after flood events. Many 
Harvey-flooded properties in Houston were not made sufficiently aware of their floodplain vulnerability, 
particularly the subdivisions built inside the flood well of the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs. Some home-
owners say the flood risk was written in the fine print or not present at all in their contracts. A project by 
TAMU Galveston professor Sam Brody called Buyers BeWhere is a web tool allowing homeowners to find a 
risk assessment score for any plat in Harris and Galveston counties.94 With tools like this one, academics are 
taking it upon themselves to take information and make it accessible to the public, because depending on the 
storm, any Houstonian can live in the floodplain.95   
During flood events, information is distributed through radio, television, and social media, but during 
Harvey these methods did not prove effective. The two categories of vital response during Harvey were 
threat-driven response of the hurricane itself, and even-driven response, further hazards related to possible 
dam failure and sequential release.96 Though Houston at large rightly determined any call for citywide evac-
94  See Appendix C for web tools 
95  Anecdotal - phrase from local Houston residential architect 
96  Hurricane Harvey Report. Id., 63 – Evacuation 
Figure 12: Houston as socially isolated islands during Harvey, over image by Washington Post, 2017
Figure 13: Houston as socially and physically isolated islands during Harvey
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uation would cause more problems than it would solve, some smaller cities still called for mandatory evacu-
ation, including Bay City and Sugarland. This is an example of threat-driven response, and on the small scale 
of these examples, worked quite well. Event-driven response includes the alert that the Addicks and Barker 
Reservoirs would undergo controlled release to save the infrastructure from massive failure. Residents along 
the Buffalo Bayou were warned the day before that controlled release would occur in the night, and were ad-
vised to gather belongings and evacuate at sunup. The Addicks release was slated to start at 2am, with Barker 
releasing 24 hours later, but was moved up to 12:31am, and word was sent out via tweet.97
During these turbulent events, many unofficial platforms attempted to help spread information. In 
one example, Waffle House updated Twitter with location closures that were used to pseudo-analyze the 
worst flooded areas.98 Other more sinister and sensationalist misinformation was spread via social media 
platforms like Facebook and Twitter.99 These tools served as multipliers for both accurate and inaccurate up-
dates, resulting in general confusion during the continued flooding as conflicting information spread across 
the internet. 
Even after the Hurricane Harvey exited stage right, residents remain unclear whether their damages 
are actionable. The federally funded buyout program is encumbered by legalese, and residents must negoti-
ate applying to the program before they can even graduate to benefiting from it. As we fast approach another 
hurricane season, many Houstonians are still displaced or rebuilding from the last one. Lastly, there is inac-
cessibility to the information we do have concerning how individuals can prepare for flood events. The City 
of Houston added a 43 page document to its emergency preparedness cite in 2016.100 The document contains, 
on the last page, instructions for ordering the document in other languages.101 Smaller local bodies have tak-
en on the onus of disaster preparedness, with upcoming Hurricane Town Hall meetings during the summer 
of 2019.102 
97  “COE Releases on Addicks and Barker Reservoirs has started,” @JeffLindner1, Aug. 28 2017. 
98  Id., 65, Emergency Response 
99  Id., 76, Communication: the effects of ‘Fake News’
100  See Appendix C for online material for emergency preparedness.
101  See Appendix A for reference 
102  See Appendix C for scheduled town halls for Houston resiliency
Any plan to mitigate flood risk in Houston must address these vulnerabilities. The immobility, isola-
tion and information deficit are all necessary levels of social architecture that exceed the capabilities of the 
Ike Dike spine proposal. Any plan must also emulate the multi-functional intervention of the Delta Plan, em-
ploying both hard and soft mitigation tactics to plan for the future. Any plan must also address the underly-
ing causes of Houston’s manmade vulnerability, reversing past measures where possible and preventing their 
spread everywhere else. Lastly, this plan must be spatially and temporally fractal, scalable to the individual, 
the neighborhood, and the region, on the right-now timeline, the 2050 timeline, and the 2100 hundred time-
line. What Houston needs, is a String of Pearls. 
Figure 14: String of Pearls intersects with physically and socially isolated islands
Source:  Twitter, captured 2018 Reservoir release during Harvey, source:  ProPubblica, 2017
Figure 15: The String of Pearls
Houston Resiliency Plan - A String of Pearls
closed loop tidal sensors
Internal development pearl
Room for the Rivers Plan 
Edge condition pearl
Edge condition pearl
The String of Pearls is a chain of sustain-
able development pods centered around retain-
ment reservoirs that function as recreational space 
at all other times. This image is both representa-
tional and metaphorical, meaning that each Pearl 
increases in tangibility as the study zooms further 
inward. The highlighted Pearls show the first ar-
eas that merit the next step of interrogation. The 
Pearls are low-impact developments with minimal 
impervious cover. 
Figure 16: The String of Pearls - soft infrastructure 
Houston Resiliency Plan - A String of Pearls
closed loop tidal sensors
Wave attenuation
Room for the Rivers Plan 
oyster reef restoration 
The String of Pearls also incorporates soft 
infrastructure into its spatial planning. Here you 
can see oyster restoration projects in pink, with 
past and present oyster reefs in green and yellow. 
The Deltawerken used natural mitigation efforts 
like sand nourishment and wave attenuation as 
contingency plans that will adapt to their chang-
ing climate. The Pearls scheme must also use soft 
infrastructure planning like oyster seeding to give 
Houston longevity and natural resiliency. 
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4.0 Houston as a String of Pearls 
The String of Pearls is a multivalent resiliency strategy for Houston., Texas, with three thematic 
categories - the Pearls, the Bayous, and the Archipelago. The scheme is a fractal solution that can be imple-
mented at many scales, and aims to mitigate Houston’s compound vulnerability through physical and social 
planning. The Pearls relieve the pressure on the overburden bayou watersheds and divert excess flow outside 
of the normal release zone. The system is multi-functional, emulating  the Delta Work’s usefulness during 
and beyond the rainy season. The Pearls can be implemented as Houston’s main mitigation strategy or as an 
a complimentary system to the proposed Coastal Spine. The Pearls also have natural relationship with many 
parts of Houston, not solely the city’s edge, and can serve as catalyst for the zones of the city we have identi-
fied as the most vulnerable during flood events. 
4.1 The Pearls  
The String of Pearls is a chain of pro-development pods centered around detainment reservoirs to 
relieve the pressure on the overburdened bayou system. The String of Pearls catches and stores water during 
rainfall events, and releases it outside of the highly vulnerable Galveston Bay, effectively circumventing the 
compound flood zone of central Houston along the Ship Channel. They augment a modified version of the 
Ike Dike proposal, filling its gaps in scope. The Pearls are public-private partnerships facilitated by extra-gov-
ernmental bodies like Central Houston, a corporation that develops place-making urbanism in the city’s 
downtown.103 Partnerships that imitate this corporation will be formed for each of the Pearl zones, combing 
local input, design skillsets, and public and private funding to craft place-makers in each neighborhood that 
benefit the communities around them. 
The String of Pearls accepts that any scheme that is anti-development will not succeed in Houston. 
Because of this, each Pearl is a site-specific example of sustainable development, a car-less neighborhood 
situated along existing commercial rail lines with new schools, single and multi family homes, small busi-
nesses and recreational zones that can act as reservoirs during storm events. Free from car-dependency, the 
Pearls minimize impervious cover while maximizing walkability and passively healthy living. Each green 
space reserved as emergency reservoir space will enforce minimal development, with only educational visitor 
103  See Appendix C for local Houston companies working on sustainable urbanism
centers and public bathrooms built on site. The commuter needs are satisfied by Shell sponsored electrical 
transit pods, which pop on and off the existing rail lines to bring residents into the downtown during peak 
commuter hours. The student population is ferried laterally by School Trolleys, the sustainable evolution of 
the school bus, where students can get tutoring help and healthy breakfast on the way to class. 
The new school system is a series of Big Energy-sponsored elementary, middle and high schools, 
which employ technology and sustainability-savvy faculty to teach the Green Curriculum. The Green Curric-
ulum augments the Texas standard requirements while also rooting education in the past, present and future 
of the anthropocene. The Green Curriculum at the high school level guarantees top 15% graduates admission 
into the top environmental studies, sustainable engineering, and environmental law programs at public uni-
versities throughout the state, including the University of Texas and Texas A&M sister school systems as well 
as city universities. The Green Curriculum also incorporate energy internship into the curriculum, allowing 
upperclassmen to spend part of their school day gaining valuable insight at their sponsoring Energy Compa-
ny. For students that don’t pursue college education, each Energy Company partner guarantees admittance to 
an affiliate technical or trade school focused on alternative energy production, a direct link to future employ-
ment in the Energy Capital of the World. 
The String of Pearls is a long-term plan, and can be likened to the Delta Works in their scope. But 
unlike the Deltawerken, the Pearls strive to help Texans out of preexisting vulnerabilities associated with 
low-income neighborhoods – education and employment. The new home construction will help fund the 
other public programs present in the Pearls, the private partnership with energy giants will help communities 
prosper while the corporations gain positive public image and a future employment force of well-educated 
graduate and skilled tradesmen. Yet this construction process will take time, an estimated 50-70 years from 
initial planning to completion, even in a city with Houston’s impressive development resume. To truly imple-
ment an effective plan, intermediate steps must be taken. 
4.2 The Bayous  
The String of Pearls is augmented by Buyout the Bayou, a plan to gradually subtract development 
from the edges of our bayous to allow for their widening and deepening. The buyouts are facilitate by the 
existing Harris County Flood District buyout program, but once acquired the land is ceded to the EPA for 
re-naturalization of the bayou section. A staff of ten full time employees is assigned to each bayou to facilitate 
the application process, as well as mediate between neighborhood associations and the EPA when the bayou 
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widening comes into effect.104 The return of the bayous to natural state will be accompanies by running trails, 
pedestrian bridges and rain gardens to naturally clean water and provide more beautiful views for residents 
who opt to stay. The 21st century will see cities rise and fall by the use of their urban waterfronts. The Bayou 
City has tremendous place-making potential now underutilized in its internal water’s edges, and the time is 
ripe for a rise in the city’s perceived livability. This plan allows for flexibility in bayou capacity to allow for the 
estimated sea level rise in the area by 2100. This process is expected to take 30 years to complete, but it is en-
couraging that is has already started. This initiative can also feed into the existing Houston Bayou Greenways 
Concept by Bayou Greenways 2020, referenced below.105 
If more land is acquired than the EPA deems necessary to expanded bayou capacity, local artists can 
work with residents to memorialize the heroic actions of the Volunteer Navy during Hurricane Harvey. To 
date there are 100 proposed improvements among the 22 watersheds of the Bayou City106 - these can be pop-
ulated by the local artist projects. The new art map of the Houston bayous, like its precursor in Holland, will 
add an imagery of memory that the residents deserve, commemorating their loss and their strength. 
104  This is modeled after a collaborative approach to flooding in North Carolina, where the state worked with communities affect-
ed by Hurricane Fran of 1996 to explore available options. In some cases, entire communities opted to relocate together. Referenced in 
Consortium, 11. 
105  Referenced in Blackburn, 44. Image courtesy of Houston Parks Board.
106  Id., 43. 
4.3 The Archipelago   
Additionally, the Archipelago is a possible system of social programs that arms the physically isolated 
islands depicted in figure # to protect and react to flood events. Each island is a Flood Village, with a board of 
volunteers and local leaders who will be trained to disseminate information and aid to their respective con-
stituents through social media. The Village leadership will be equally representative of the varying income 
brackets that comprise the affected Village area, and distribute information in every language representa-
tive of the Village populace. Each island Village will be outfitted with emergency response services housed 
in existing unused buildings, and will designate a school or community center with the capacity to serve as 
home base. Food, water and clothing will be kept at the home base, and will serve as the town hall for each 
Flood Island prior to hurricane season so that residents are familiar with the location. The town hall venues 
will hold meetings with their flood constituents bi-monthly, and form emergency response volunteers that 
are familiar with sandbag protocol and can aid families in flood-proofing their homes. Residents will be 
informed which Flood Village they will have access to during flood events, and will be encouraged to partici-
pate in Island planning measures prior to disaster events. This plan can be enacted immediately, using social 
media and neighborhood leadership to ensure Village Leadership is trusted to receive and interpret citywide 
information. 
Source, Houston Parks Board, 2016
X
X
Figure 19: graphic for temporal scale of projects 
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The multivalent resiliency plan contained herein is tripartite – the Pearls, the Bayous, and the Archi-
pelago. Each piece is fractal in the scales of space and time. Each piece accounts for the social needs of the af-
fected areas. Each pieces intends to decrease the vulnerability of the Houston populace regardless of income 
or immigration status. 
This String of Pearls is an opportunity to craft physical and social infrastructure that can protect 
against worst-case scenarios, but also act as productive pieces of the city outside the rainy season. With the 
wealth disparity present in Houston, the disproportionate burden these issues and their infrastructural 
solutions will place at the feet of our most vulnerable populations is a powerful precedent to set for other 
American resiliency plans. Careful assessment of the Dutch precedent is a useful method to interrogate our 
own needs specific to Texas. Combined with an approach informed by the city’s history, demographics, and 
economic power could set the tone for other Sentinels in the American South. The penultimate goal of this 
thesis is translation: from data to visualization, from private knowledge to public knowledge, and from victim 
to victor. Together, we can build a better Texas – and it starts in Houston, our Sentinel City.  
 
5.0 Conclusion 
This report has demonstrated through research, observation and design the compound vulnerability 
and its proposed mitigation in Houston, Texas. The city is a complex organism that faces multisystem fail-
ure from the compounding effects of human intervention on a natural environment already predisposed to 
flooding. Both historical and recent events lead us to treat Houston, Texas as the direst Sentinel City, but the 
metropolis also has a great capacity to serve as a model for other urban resiliency plans. Any scheme that is 
proposed to aid Houston must treat the underlying causes of the rampant flooding as well as its symptoms. 
The proposed Ike Dike Coastal Spine is the foremost among Houston-area resiliency schemes, but 
it does not attempt curative methods of addressing Houston’s predisposition to flooding. Further study of its 
main precedent, the Deltawerken of the Netherlands, reveals deep differences in methodology between the 
two schema. However, Houston can still learn from the Dutch precedent, particularly its social architecture 
that complements and empowers the physical. Using these ideas, the String of Pearls is a strategy that em-
ploys spatial and social programming to set a sustainable example for development in Houston. Through the 
addition of development Pearls and subtraction along the bayous, the String of Pearls outlines a future that 
Houston is perfectly positioned to attain. The Pearls strategy also initiates its tripartite measures in order of 
immediacy, with the organization of the Archipelago as emergent programming, in a kind of soft phasing. 
The String of Pearls aims to act on different scales of space and time. The schema both critiqued and pro-
posed herein can be applied to other Sentinel Cities in the United States, the first metropoles in the country 
to exhibit signs of climate change related stress, and around the world. 
The main limitation of this report is the lack of community outreach. One of the central narratives of 
the String of Pearls infrastructure is resident involvement. If taken further, this report would work with Hous-
ton communities in the Archipelago targeted zones to craft holistic models of the social programs described. 
Cities of the 21st century will rise and fall by the way they handle urban water, and the extent to which they 
allow their public to drive that negotiation. Houston is uniquely suited to lead the charge into our science 
fiction future of climate-augmented storms and sea level rise. The city’s founding, formation, growth and 
prestige are her armament – the future of American resiliency is her inheritance. It is the hope of this report 
that the Houston of 2100 is a stronger, more equitable and sustainable Sentinel City. 
The stage is set, the cast is chosen and the world is watching – Houston, what will you become?
Figure 18: The Archipelago
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8.0 Appendices
Appendix A - Extended Source Imagery
Source, AcreValue.com
The appendices A and B hold extended imagery from sources and from travel documentation. They 
are included here in alphabetical order by topic. Appendix C contains web tools and useful online sources for 
how to get involved with Houston’s flood mitigation journey. 
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Sentinel Cities map 
SENTINEL CITY AS FRAMEWORK
 Houston, Texas is one of a dozen Sentinel Cities in the U.S. that will be 
the first to exhibit signs of climate change induced stress. The Earth’s 
rapidly changing climate is the most daunting problem facing our world 
today. Many cities in the United States area already facing the inevitable 
infrastructural failures brought on by climate-change related stressors like 
drought, warming induced storms, and sea level rise. Planners, architects 
and governments alike are looking for precedents at home and abroad to 
mitigate these issues before they wreak havoc. One such case is Houston, 
a metropolis historically famous for its lack of zoning regulation, now 
regretting its laissez-fare regulatory nature. The first in this series of Sentinels 
is Houston because it is a microcosm of many larger national issues: the role 
of government in climate resiliency, industry giants in the public sphere, 
sanctuary city status and demographic divides along economic lines. A 
resiliency plan for Houston would go far in modeling the country’s stance 
on mediating the changing climate with the plethora of social issues that 
accompany mega-cities in America. Ideally, this project would go on to 
address each of the identified Sentinels indicated in the graphic below.  DELTA WORKS AS PRECEDENT
 The proposed “Ike Dike” is a system of floodgates and barriers modeled 
after the Netherlands’ Deltawerken. If we truly wish to exemplify Houston 
as one of our country’s first resilient cities, it is essential to study the effect of 
the Deltawerken on the urban population since its construction. This can only 
be done through direct observation and documentation. Over spring break I 
was able to travel to Holland to study these structures within the context of 
the entire Dutch history of water management. I was fortunate enough to run 
the “Pearls” scheme across professors at Delft University, and discuss it with 
long-time hydraulic engineer and veteran of the first two Delta Plans, Robert 
Missdorp, a family friend. Lastly, I was able to visit the Maeslantkering, the 
grandest and most recent of the Delta Works, and five other works during my 
travels. 
CURRENT MITIGATION EFFORTS
One proposed solution is the “Ike Dike,” a system of floodgates and 
barriers modeled after the Netherlands’ Deltawerken, or Delta Works, of 
South Holland and Zeeland, a storm surge mitigation system constructed 
in response to a devastating 1953 flood. Since it’s construction, the Delta 
Works have proved successful at preventing loss of property and life. If we 
truly wish to exemplify Houston as one of the country’s first resilient cities, it 
is essential to study the effect of the Deltawerken on the urban population 
since its construction. 
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Currently, the Army Core of Engineers is researching 
a proposed coastal spine of defensive infrastructure 
nicknamed the “Ike Dike.” This scheme was devel-
oped with help from Delft Technology University in 
the Netherlands, a country with a rich history of suc-
cessful flood mitigation. 
RESEARCH + PRELIMI-
NARY DESIGN PHASE |
CONCLUSIONS
NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH
 The “Ike Dike” coastal proposal is inherently flawed because it addresses 
the problem of Houston flooding during storm events in only one direction 
- from the sea. There are many problems built into Houston’s city planning 
that exacerbate flooding issues during a crisis. The most important of these 
is the city’s pre-existing watershed confluence in Galveston Bay, into which 
all its bayous drain. During a storm event, this body of water temporarily rises 
dramatically because of storm surge, the tidal rise of water on the positive 
side of a storm system. When the Bay is rising due to storm surge and the bay-
ous are rapidly filling with storm water and runoff, the rivers and the sea both 
pour into Houston’s highly populated coastal edge and back up the bayous, 
causing flooding in the city center and along bayous. 
San Francisco Bay Area, CA
San Diego , CA
Salt Lake City, UT
Las Vegas, NV
Phoenix, AZ
New York City, NY
Norfolk, VA
Miami-Deade, FL
New Orleans, LA
El Paso, TX 
Houston, TX 
Houston, Texas is uniquely suited to become the mod-
el case study for American city resiliency. By adapting 
Dutch social and spatial techniques to Houston’s unique 
geography and demography, this thesis can set a prece-
dent for resiliency plans in America that protect vulner-
able populations in our cities, who disproportionately 
bear the burden of climate stress. The production phase 
of this thesis will result in policy and design at the scale 
of the state, city and neighborhood.
Houston needs a combined approach that addresses the root problems of 
its flood problems with internal and external measures. To ensure support, this 
plan must also work with the vessels of the city’s historic success: free market 
development, and the oil/gas industry. 
Archipelago of physical barriers :
The negative space from highway flooding 
incidents + inundation sites during Hurri-
cane Harvey
Archipelago of social barriers :
The negative space from highway flooding 
incidents + non-English-as-first-language-
speaking populations
Archipelago of 
socio-physical isolates :
the overlapping space btween 
both below diagrams
Population growth in Houston, 1980 - 2015Resevoir release during Harvey
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From Premala: Rotterdam AirBnB Houseboat host: Emi is bff, 
Emiliano Gandolfi, curator of NAE for 8yr“money is just the manifestation of attention and energy
Watersnoodamp museum: Ria Geluk says hi to Bas!
Interior by Utrecth “Podium” firm for first caisson, expanded 
into the next four but changed twice already by Kermer and 
Hermnd firm
The museum is just inhabotating the English donated cias-
sons big concrete frames for emergency flood mitigations, then new farther dikes were constructed
Dikes wre bombe dby allied forces to flood the germans, and post WWII there were other needs, social, infrastructural 
Kuubhaus
Kinerdijk notes: Romans said, too wet, cant build here. St. 
Elizabeth’s Flood
No one knows exactly why got the name, 1738 – millers  built 
the 8 brick windmills, 1940, eight thatched
Stepwise drain system. Gauge (lead) mill would signal to others
Notes from Delft: Baukje is actually visiting Houston, Bas out 
of town, Nikki possibly, call and give number
Delta travel day: Maeslantkering triangular truss framework, 
big trade route had to keep open, only 2 times closed, once was false alarm-ishFarther down waterweg is kering in de hollandsche I jussel, 
closes five times a year and protects lowerst parts of the country
Why both? Closing full harbor costs 100mill euro/day
“fighting the water” = bullshit. We love the water. Ex. Zanmo-
tor, artificial sand isalnds, Hook of Holland, in his little town, after storm, special place for sea cement, tide will spread the sandafter 20yrs, naturally done
examples of DW used in New Orleans, IHNC Barrier, sluice, 
barrier, sluice, problem was dikes on edge
sea water not warm ebough in Nederlands for Hurricanes
Hurricane systm only about rain (not true my guy, we get 
storm surge too)1750 to new Zealand dikes end to end, in 22yrs only twice closed, most from the SW spring time
biggest moveable in the world
thames barrier, Enlgand, maselant guy went there and 
created international istorm – Russia joined, st Petersburg 
derivative
italy joined, venice, money went to the mafia (what??) Doge’s 
Palac first floor cloumns are wonky bc keep sinking and replacing
SW Holland Deltawerekn overview, 1958 Hollandshe I 
Jiselkerig why still open to Antwerp? Very strong dikes on southern edge
2017 US Coast Guard in charge guy visited and said immei-
datly what is the price tag, half a bill $
tax eberyone pays – water safety, local tax country tax, wa-
terboards for dirnking water, gateas and cluices. 
San technique – all done by nature, New Delta Plan for extra protection 25 yrs
Travel Note and Sketches ***transcription was via automatic scan to text Next problem is river water: Give room to the river, subtrac-
tion, make deeper, bypass system around city/village, pump 
from canals to river to sea
What if both at the same time? (rain + surge) 1/1500 chance
Move water to lakes sluices of smart water system, hold 
there for 48 hrs, pump out of lakes into river
If not enough water? Salt water flows into rivers if no rain
Bad for plants and life, pump out of lakes into river to keep at 
bay the backflow
2003 dike barrier in dry summer bc made of peat, cracks when dry, inspections of dikes during dry periods and wet. If too dry then they spray the,
dry periods are getting londer and linger, 1953 = 16hr storm, high tide and low tide, so 24 hrs and 24 exra spray peat and 
stays wet, don’t have to every day or etcactual gate: painted on inside too, task took 4 years during maintenance season april 15 to spe 30th, on spe 30th test 
closure every year 3000 ppls, festical
bottom tubes fills with water to make it sink faster, 300,000 
litres of paint by hand, 7 yr contruction 10m length of pipes 
ball joint transpo walls 22 m high, dry dock now, fill half 
during storm season, why white? Steel heats and expands 
max 20cm Eiffel tower laying on its side
comuters alert when high time, iperatonal team, 8 hrs before 
closure, 2 hrs until they can get out (they = commerce ships)
gap of 80cm bc of flux if rough waters collides and break and 
that is v expenicesink to protects, open gates into 1.5 hrs to sink, sink slow 
so no tsunami to Rotterdam slow bc dirst leaves with sle 
fpropogating current as well. You can lift + lot then close and sink, tidal diff 1.5 m
kids make dikes when they play on the beach in the sand – the knowledge is there
schools 7-8 leanring people survived trauma, still scared30’ pumps get water out so can lift again, comes out the ends that stay on dry land
one power station on each side, and diesel near back always 
close in 2 hrs, open again take longer on backup bc of pump-ing
operations bldg., comp. not on internet, not hackable, even 
sensors on close dloop, matenance by contractors and subslast test closure:touring w minister women wants 
to get in the bldg. to make her book more belivable, finished 
book in jan, can yu rread it before I publish it? 400 pgs, 
so good! Hacking at barrier, did not concern flood, kept it 
closed, river went still for days (in book obvi)
in may book is ublished woman is going to come and do a 
signing netlfix making movie about climte change and featur-ing maeslantkering
land use? Hiking biking training bc good elevation to train on 
2/3 of dutch territory subject to flodding from sea, lakes, 
rivers,
10 designs submittedrolled steel 9cm thickompleted and operational in 1997
sinks as fills, 10m diameter ball joint all directions move-ment, concrete sillcoastline reinforced naturally wind and sand safety/nature/recreation/economics
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too much, too little, too salty. Too polluted
film by metropolis films
east coast warm bc tropicsnorth sea straight down from the arctic, cold
back to Kinderdijk notes: the alblasserwaard area windmills pumping stations dikes and waterways work together to drain soil, 19 windmills draining the polder ground since middle ages
low and high bozeems = storage based + sluices
1738-1740 built windmills
replaced first by steam power and then by diesel
“We are only human, and the Gods have fashioned us for 
love.” – Aegon Targaryen
Questions for Rob: 
Chief engineer, physical geography, oceanogprhay la the be-
ginning study, waves, sedimetns, ecology. Frim 3 sides: third side is time
Advising from Holland to china, designing in BejingCoastal emigration
81% of coatline built up area in Belgium, w/out zoning
in Netherlands regulation, hospitals, universities, etc
biggest sluice complex in harbor leadeing to Amsterdam cruise ships is enough there enough
Belgium going to build artificial breaker islands 1990 official 
coastal policy to fix 1990 montioring on coastal erosionSand spraying 
Costal dynamic policy – sand nourishment
Dune reinforcement at North Sea 3 to 4x deeperData collection
15yrs ago said NO to development alongthe coastline com-mittee cut in new to the ministries of housing and econmocs
Amsterdam by schipol airport late
Too big for windmill polders, 1850 UK steam engines, 3 big pumping stationsDike ring, water out to ringShips were wrecked, schip hol, took year to drain, then saw the ships
80% nature in the Netherlands coastline
50mill/ yer thru AMS, 60% fly thru, 40% would like
KLM and Air China – 3mill tousidts mayor deal
Air BnB has covenant with city but others? No
Flex, no contract workers, transient bc no job, no home bc no lans
Enough is enough
Shortening of coaltine 900kmzandmoort = purification cor-als of water, leeward side of hard leements there is eroisuon,
Start small, plz can we have camping or cafetira then cabins then hotels 
Keeping coaline natural is the key1697, house, 1760 new part
effects on urbanism 8 yrs to 50 yrs maeslant berrier gate – 
by the free mkt not deisnged by gov
VERY religious pple lving there, 300,000 people in the coast-al towns no insurance Duente pay for low 1950s farmers and 
religion – storm was act of god
Engineers from the North come in 90% of marina is for 
yachts that don’t even moveSpace usage is weirdSmall communites ask, can we get tourism> 
Recreations for locals,
45 tall pillars, 1mm accuracy started from small to big
Rotterdam dloffing from sea and river
Pipelines also in Rotterdam multinational Technical secretary secretary for IPSS for costal cities 
“rainbow dredging”integrated management
put their name at the top = idotr of your writing
summary and put real material on the websiteclimate coastal cooperation
payed by the taxparyer
Vietnamese coastal effects in asia – 13 times as mission leaderShanghai pere and post pollution era, 20,000 sourc-
es of pollution ebb and flow of the river
Water movement model, then prioritise nad reorganize the ministries
ACE not stupid, they can build a dike
New Orleans, dams withelf sediments from missiissippi delta Taking out oil sinking and shrinking
Biloxi, LA 0 mayor gets federal money and then theyrebuild in the same place
Guld, 2% rise m in the last 30 years26’ needed for typhoons
geological fracture? Sinking, hosuton plan: Big visions
 1980s big oil always fiishing scret
time is the ingredient other factors beside slimate change 
subsoil mechanismgeological slipping, spatial and temporal.
Yippee!“The world is changed, I feel it in the water, I feel it in the 
earth, I smell it in the air. Much that once was is lost”
relation b/w flood and urbanismnot a lot of empirical data coastal crucial spot in the system, 
SPEED center in Hosuton
ecological response to the Netherlands
mutli-fucntional bc it is also road infrastructure
sptial, what is the 1000 year plan?
Talk with Nikki: series of hypotheticlas, proper lifespans 
eresits event of a certain, larger sizes and more often quickly erode infra, upgrade more often
Elevate the house, must be independt from the gov’t, cul-
ture where flood safety is separated from gov., left to them 
who are considered knowlegdble, too important for oyur opinion,promote more of residential facilitated the leisure 
economy, makes sense but exact blog after havrey
Rice – offside blog, outside, tale of two cities, integrated sto-
ries, 15pt plan, ACE – very secretive, really involved after IKE 
bc competition btw schemes and it was a zero sum games, 
after havery just fihgitng eahcother, international companies 
sniffing around for big contracts, ACE, Delta Scenario
Riverplain buyouts, TAMU delta program, NAFWIS exec agen-cy of ministry, older than all other ministries really, Delta 
commissioner w/out interfence from parliament/ cabinet, 
independent, Reichwaterstracht, formaily, 2nd Delta Program, 
Room for the River identified weak spots agreementbtw countries on how much water is sent down
Capacity of river increased by a lot, 2 options, 1. Cooperate, you are in cahge, 2. We will do it for you
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Appendix C – Web Tools and Resources
IPCC Global Warming of 1.5C Summary for Policymakers Bayou City Initiative 
Sea Level Rise Interactive Web Tool 
Central HoustonInteractive Houston 
Flooding Article
Katie Prairie Conservancy
Houston Emergency Prep Guide
Flagship, we will do it ourselves, incentives tied to it, short-
age of bridges so get 1 more  “spatial quality projects” spatial 
planning objectives, riverpark, park attaché dto the bypass, 
got a regulation passed to build outside of the dike, sialnds, 
bypass, nature reserve river park,Delta program buyout 
hired a lady 24/7 negotiated with every single family that 
was displaced, increased from market price, positive feed-
back loop, room for the river city
Need passionate acadmeics like me, Stefan Nijhuis, Steenber-
gen, both at TU Delft
Ooze = Ava and Silvan, working with the delta pple on their 
india work
Water and sanitation in slums
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